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In the course of recent work in Baghdad, I have gained some personal
perspectives regarding what it takes to do reconstruction business in Iraq under
the rules and realities of the U.S.-led administration of Iraq. Most particularly,
I have witnessed the dilemmas, discouragements and challenges encountered
by struggling small and mid-size Iraqi businesses that been left either "capital
depleted" or "capital flat." This lack of capital arises in largest part because
financing structures and facilities for these privately-owned entities disappeared with the collapse of the former regime, and no initiative has yet been
taken to remedy this unfortunate situation. In my view, very serious policy and
practical implications flow directly from this difficult, but fixable, set of facts.
My suggestions are borne of substantial involvement with the post-Cold
War reconstitution of the economies of Central and Eastern European states
as well as the Republics of the former Soviet Union, and the reconstruction of
Bosnia, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and, now, Iraq. In
Iraq, I have been involved in critical assessment and analysis of the legal
system and business economy of Iraq since 1997. Most recently, I have spent
the better part of the past six months on the ground "in country," speaking with
approximately 300 senior Iraqi business, banking, legal, professional and
political leaders about what is needed now to make the reconstruction a
success, and then critically examining what each had to say, from practical,
economic, legal and political perspectives.
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CAPITAL CONCENTRATION IN LARGE FAMILY-RUN BUSINESSES

Under present circumstances in Iraq, small and mid-size Iraqi businesses
are forced to turn to practically the only sources that are ready, willing and
able to provide financing of subcontracts awarded by the American firms that
hold the U.S. Government and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) prime
contracts: the capital-sufficient business entities owned and operated by most
of the twelve prominent and influential Iraqi families. These are the twelve
families who have been dominant in the Iraqi private sector dating back to the
Ottoman rule.
The leaders of these family-owned and operated entities are business-savvy
and know how to extend an advantage, and they do just that. These entities
have been well capitalized, and are well financed-perhaps even more so now
that the former regime has passed. The family leaders of such large businesses
protected their assets over the last thirty-five years by transferring large sums
of money out of Iraq to global financial centers, such as Geneva, to protect
against the ravages of the former regime. And they know well the Iraqi private
business sector and understand how to maneuver in the Iraqi marketplace to
gain advantage for the short-, medium- and long-term. Consequently, these
large entities "snap up" opportunities when and where circumstances allow.
What does that mean in the realm of reconstruction contracting by undercapitalized small/mid-size Iraqi firms? Simply this: with no place else to turn for
financing, these fledgling Iraqi businesses must turn to the family-dominated
entities for financing, on onerous terms that we in the West would considered
to be predatory.
The typical deal goes something like this:
1. A medium or small Iraqi firm that historically possesses the qualifications to do certain types of work-for example, providing concrete or other
building materials, or doing mechanical/electrical work on reconstruction or
new construction-becomes qualified to bid for an Army Corps of Engineers
or U.S.A.I.D. subcontract through Halliburton/Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR)
or Bechtel, respectively. Of course, U.S. Government money will pay for this
subcontracted work.
2. In the aftermath of the war, these technically-capable small/midsize Iraqi
companies cannot obtain contract financing from any financial institution-whether Western, Arab or Iraqi public or private sector (e.g., either of
the state-owned banks or the seventeen or so Iraqi private banks)-simply
because the risks of providing contract financing in the current environment
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are deemed to be too high to place at risk the capital and shareholder
investment in such banks/financial institutions.
3. The small/mid-size company then goes to the only available financing
market-that is, the capital-sufficient entities owned and controlled by one of
the twelve families, and receives these non-negotiable terms:
For a $1 million contract performed over a period of three-to-six months,
the borrowing business must increase the bid to provide the lending family
entity with a return equal to one-half of the maximum profit that can be
obtained on the project-perhaps a net of ten percent to the lending family for
putting well less than $1 million at risk for a few months. This becomes the
baseline bid price to Bechtel, KBR and others for most bids by small/mid-size
Iraqi companies, since most (being in the same undercapitalized position) must
turn to similar financing sources and receive equivalent terms. This has the
effect of substantially driving up the contract price paid for out of U.S. funds
or the Iraqi funds administered by the U.S. through the Development Fund for
Iraq (for CPA subcontracts).
The family entity also insists on obtaining a significant ownership
interest-and in some instances controlling management of-those Iraqi
businesses that the family entity finances. This typically includes the right to
receive a share of earnings on all projects in the future, in proportion to the
family entity's newly-acquired ownership interest.
Why do the Iraqi family-owned enterprises do this? For two reasons. First,
the lending family entity uses this position in the financed company to protect
its loan/investment. Second, and perhaps more importantly, having an equity
interest in the financed business allows the large family entity to capture
additional shares of the Iraqi reconstruction market-and cash flow-by virtue
of the control that can be exercised over small/mid-size Iraqi firms that have
already succeeded in being qualified by the CPA, Bechtel, KBR and the like
to bid on Iraqi reconstruction subcontract tenders funded by U.S. and Iraqi
dollars.
4. The small/mid-size Iraqi company then successfully performs the
contract.
5. The small/mid-size Iraqi company then delivers one-half of the inflated
profits to the financing family entity.
6. The small/mid-size Iraqi company, under the oversight and perhaps
control of the large family entity, bids other contracts, and the process repeats
itself over and over, and dollars flow into the coffers of both the family-owned
entities, as well as lesser earnings to the small/mid-size Iraqi businesses. All
of this goes on "under the surface" in private transactions between large
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family-owned enterprises and those smaller Iraqi business entities that need
this help because no alternative-such as the formation and operation of
regulated finance companies, equivalent to what exists here in the United
States and elsewhere in the world-exists for these legitimate but undercapitalized independent businesses.
The overall effect of this circumstance is deleterious to creating short- and
long-term economic, political and social stability in the Iraqi private business
sector. First, as in America, restoring the health of small/mid-size Iraqi
businesses is and will continue to be the single most powerful engine for
employing the forty to fifty percent of Iraqis who want jobs but simply cannot
find them. The vitality of the Iraqi private business sector drove the prosperity
in Iraq during the economic boom of the mid- to late-1980s-before the IranIraq war took its toll on the Iraqi economy, before Saddam Hussein's invasion
of Kuwait and the ensuing the Gulf War, and before the UN sanctions regime.
This private sector development is not occurring as it could. The small/midsize Iraqi businesses who do not cave in to the financing demands of the large
family enterprises simply do not get capitalized, and, therefore, cannot
effectively compete for the reconstruction contracts. Companies that cannot
compete for these contracts cannot put employees back to work, much less
expand their workforces by hiring Iraqis that desperately want to go back to
work.
Additionally, with fewer Iraqi qualified companies independently operating
because of unsolved capitalization problems, legitimate competition for U.S.
Government- and CPA-funded subcontracts is not what it could be, and
contract prices are far above what they should be. One example is the cement
industry in Iraq. In July and August of this year, the price of cement soared to
almost $100 per ton in Iraq-more than twice what it was on the world market.
This was because Iraqi cement companies had not been capitalized to re-start
operations, and therefore were not producing for or operating in the domestic
market. Of course, at that price, cement from outside Iraq flooded the market.
The price of cement in Iraq dropped to about $60/ton-still significantly above
the world market price. And, most of the "capital flat" Iraqi cement companies
remained without the capital to resume operations, simply because there was
no financial institution source for legitimate borrowing to recapitalize these
businesses. (Excepting, of course, those private sector cement companies that
cut financing deals with the family-owned enterprises, along the model I have
just discussed.)
Finally, private sector capital is being unnecessarily concentrated in Iraq in
the hands of the well-capitalized family-owned entities. If history is a guide,
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the power that comes with such capital concentration likely will be used to
further the market position and interests of a privileged few, to the detriment
of the many Iraqi entrepreneurs who are willing, but presently unable, to restart and expand existing businesses as well as start new businesses.
THE NEED FOR PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
DEDICATED TO CONTRACT FINANCING

Each of these deleterious effects can be avoided by the United States and
the U.S.-led CPA establishing the predicate conditions for the emergence in
Iraq of Iraqi private sector financial institutions dedicated to providing contract
financing to small/mid-size Iraqi businesses on non-onerous terms equivalent
to those that are seen elsewhere in the developed world. Based on discussions
with officials at the Central Bank of Iraq and extensive discussions with
various senior executives of private banks in Iraq and financial institutions in
the United States, Europe and the Arab world, I feel that it is possible now to
establish these Iraqi financial institutions, so long as the following prerequisites are created:
First, under the current circumstances in Iraq, financial institutions are most
hesitant to put their own capital at risk. Even so, however, senior executives
of a fair number of financial institutions-most particularly regulated Iraqi
private banks and Arab banks-are keen on establishing lending facilities for
contract financing if the "capital risk" problem can be solved. I estimate that
it can be solved through the creation of a lending fund of approximately $500
million from Iraqi seized assets that would be available to be drawn upon for
lending by registered Iraqi financial institutions dedicated to providing contract
financing in accordance with approved lending and risk-mitigation practices.
A fund of this size would provide sufficient "revolver" contract financing at
a level that would accommodate all Iraqi companies that are qualified to bid
for subcontracts under the forthcoming USAID $1.5 billion Phase II Infrastructure contract (the follow-on to the Bechtel infrastructure contract) and the
current and forthcoming follow-on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Operation
Restore Iraqi Oil (Operation RIO) contracts. Ideally, this fund would be
available to all financial institutions providing contract financing that meet the
conditions for regulation-much like Federal Reserve funds are made available
for loan at the Fed Rate to banks in the United States.
Second, Iraqi private banks may need to acquire or be provided with the
practical expertise to set up and conduct such contract financing lending
operations. Such expertise is present throughout the developed world, but
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infusing such expertise into lending institutions in Iraq may require a technical
assistance initiative. This can be accomplished in a straightforward manner
through CPA contracts to provide such expert technical assistance to those
financial institutions in Iraq that show themselves to be qualified and dedicated
to establishing contract financing operations. The CPA did something quite
similar in establishing the legal prerequisites-and then putting out the
tender-to establish the Iraqi Trade Bank to provide needed letters of credit
to pay for goods coming into Iraq under reconstruction contracts. This
certainly strongly suggests that such an initiative falls within the realm of the
doable here as well-as long as there is the will to do so. In conclusion, I
believe that pursuing such initiatives can result in a more cost-effective
reconstruction of Iraq as well as a further restoration of stability in Iraq
through the preservation and vibrant expansion of the independent private
business sector.

